5 It is apparent that the economic, technical, and political conditions for the communication and popular acceptance of such a contemporary notion did not exist in the late Byzantine Empire. Instead of a fully evolved modern form of nationalism we possess in Plethon's treatises an extraordinarily prescient call for a "mass nationalist movement" based on a national myth and intended to bring about a social mobilization to meet the threat of Turkish invasion and inaugurate the "dynamic process whereby pre-national peoples enter into political community with their fellows." 6 Thus, in support of the thesis that Georgios Gemistos Plethon deserves a place in the history of political thought for his early explication of the myth of nationalism and for his analysis of the socioeconomic basis of that mass mobilization which could give the myth objective efficacy, this paper will examine the philosophical origin of his proposals and their feasibility given the current situation of the Palaeologan Empire. This examination will proceed under three heads: Plethon's nationalism, his Platonically structured reforms, and his protectionism for economic development.
I. Plethon's Myth of Hellenic Nationalism
In the opening paragraphs of his treatise to Manuel, Plethon states the myth of Hellenic nationality in the form of a persuasive definition. "We are ... the Greek race which you rule, as is witnessed by our language and traditional culture." (Esmen ... Hellenes to genos hos he te phone kai he patrios paideia marturei.) 7 His claim was, in effect, that the Hellenes comprised a "race" united by language, traditional culture, and occupation of a discrete territory, the Peloponnese. This definition requires detailed analysis prior to consideration of the role and origin of the nationalist myth.
First, in using the term "Hellene" in his definition, Plethon was rejecting the universalist claims of Roman Empire and embracing a nationalist particularism. Prior to the Palaeologan revival the Byzantines commonly called themselves Rhomaioi or Romans, thereby asserting their status as continuators of the Roman world state. This claim was accepted alike by the Crusaders, who called the Empire Roumania, the Turks (Roumelia), and Arabs (Roum). Before the Fourth Crusade the term Hellene had been persistently used to denote a pagan, idolater, or gentile as opposed to "Christianos," and the criminal charge of "Hellenizing" implied both heretical and seditious behavior. Ethnic particularism was not politically important within the Empire, the highest offices being open to men of "barbarian" extraction who acquired the requisite Greek language and Christian religion. Indeed, the very term "Greek" was introduced by the Franks and bore a pejorative connotation.8 Thus, Plethon's term, Hellene, marked a reconceptualization of the Byzantine situation and may well serve to establish his position as an early theorist of nationalism. It is instructive to note that the Council of Constance, held between 1414 and 1418, the period in which Plethon's treatises were delivered, recognized in its caucuses four "nations" defined in the ad hoc manner commonly used in university organization.9
Second, Plethon amplified the national myth by calling the Hellenes a "race" or "genos" and claiming an ethnic continuity which was, as we now know, largely spurious. The inhabitants of Greece, ancient, medieval, and modern alike, were always a congeries of ethnic and linguistic strains. Like ancient Greece, the medieval Peloponnese had experienced a great deal of population mixture; from the ninth through the fourteenth centuries emperors had deliberately settled Slavs and Albanians to repopulate this war-ravaged region. The satire of Mazaris, written in Plethon's time, listed the distinct peoples occupying the Peloponnese as "Greeks" (including Hellenized Slavs), "Italians" (French, Catalans, and Sicilian Greeks), "Illyrians" (Albanians, Vlachs, Arvanito-Vlachs, and other Latinophone tribes), "Egyptians" (Gypsies), and Jews (resident since 168 B.C.). Since many Grecophone peoples had fled to the mountains, this ethnic mixture was, in fact, poorly assimilated or "Hellenized." However, despite the historical inaccuracy of Plethon's ethnic theory, it was revived during the Greek revolt of 1822 and finds qualified support among some contemporary Greek scholars.10 blocs opposing rational mobilization for self-defense. Nationalist ideology could potentially have provided a common purpose for such an effort. By calling the Hellenes a genos united by language, ancestral culture, and common territory, Plethon anticipated those "objective bonds" which comprise the sufficient if not necessary conditions for nationality according to Hans Kohn.17 Thus, Plethon's myth is not to be judged in terms of its historical veracity but rather for its potential as a unifying article of political faith. 
II. Plethon's Reforms-National Mobilization on a Platonic Basis
The major portions of Plethon's treatises expound sweeping reforms of the socioeconomic and military structure of the Peloponnese. The central theme of these reforms is the rational mobilization of all socioeconomic and political factors in order to create a centralized, autarchic, and defensible territory.
The reform proposals are for the most part specific and practical, and their Platonic derivation is clear. In the manner of Byzantine intellectuals and as the greatest Platonist of his time, Plethon claimed to draw his insights from the wisdom and political practice of the ancients."9 This tendency was reinforced by his position as advisor to the Despot Thedore and the Emperor Manuel, a situation comparable to Plato's relationship to Dionysius of Syracuse. Plethon had given Plato's abortive political effort much consideration in his historical compilation "On the History 17. Kohn, Idea, pp. 13-18 lists common descent, language, territory, political entity, customs, traditions, and religion as objective bonds.
18. Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, trans. Ralph Manheim, of the Hellenes after the Battle of Mantinea" and would in his own time attempt to replicate Plato's intention "to exchange tyranny for a Spartan regime, and to decorate the fatherland with more clement and just laws...." 20 In the treatise addressed to Manuel, Pleton offered to administer his own program of reform. "If you should command me to put these things into practice, I will undertake these public services even if no one else would have the courage. I promise to organize and consolidate the affairs of the Peloponnese in action according to the plan which I have already set forth in words." 21
The parallel in historical situations is reinforced by theoretical similarities. Like Plato, Plethon preferred monarchy to oligarchy and democracy because it provides the most noble laws and efficient administration. Neither oligarchy nor democracy promote the public good (ton koinei sympheront6n) because of the irrationality introduced into legislation by private interests, popular ignorance, and the struggle between rich and poor.22 Like Plato's monarchism Plethon's, far from being conservative, was a force for social reform insofar as it required the ruler to act as a lawgiver. As Plethon noted, "There is no other cause of a polity's faring well or ill than the excellence or weakness of the way in which its constitution (politeia) has been established. Plethon's most radical and complex proposal is definitely Platonist in implication. Like Plato in the Republic or Laws, Plethon was concerned to begin radical restructuring of the polity on a tabula rasa. He therefore proposed royal confiscation and redistribution of land to the working peasantry.
The judgment should be added to what has already been said that by nature all the land is equal and common to those dwelling on it; no one should lay claim to any part of the land as private but whoever wishes to plant should go where he will, build a house and plow as much land as he is willing and able, and each shall be master of this much land on condition that he occupies it and does not neglect to work it. No one will pay rent nor be troubled or annoyed by anyone other than those who have previously taken the land through work according to the law of common property which fits the case. Then if he should be of the Helot class, a third of his produce is taken for the common fund as we said and he is to be troubled no further, having once and for all discharged his debt. But if he is a soldier or some other among those serving the state through their acts, he shall pay no taxes but rather do the service to which he was appointed.29 Heraclius (610-641) , extended the practice into the open lands within their own borders. Thus was inaugurated the Thematic system in which approximately 60,000 small estates were created for Greek, Slavic, and Armenian soldiers to guarantee their participation in border defense. The "picked men" of this group, armed, self-supporting, and ruled by the local chief, provided the core of the Byzantine army. Economically, thematic soldiers ranged from poor peasants to yeomen and petty gentry, but all maintained a minimal inalienable estate. According to E. H. Kantorowicz, the system was highly successful. "In addition to being more economical, the theme system created a reliable peasant militia which was willing to defend its property, which drew from the soil both its livelihood and the means for waging war, and which, on top of all that, even paid some taxes to the state." 32 However, certain factors favored encroachment on thematic lands by the large landlords (dynatoi, archontes). The adoption of the expensive plate armor of the knight (kataphract), corrupt and excessive taxation, the need for mercenaries in the capital, extensive famine, and the accession of the pro-aristocratic Comneni (1081-1185) were factors promoting the re-emergence of latifundia, although a fully developed feudalism never took root in the Empire due to the peculiarities of the grant in pronoia. Pronoial grants were estates or estate revenues for the life support of individuals serving the emperor. Their number and size were controlled by the emperor's decrees, they were held only at his pleasure in return for services rendered, and subinfeudation was prohibited. This legal form could not be the basis of a truly feudal localism although the emperor's ultimate right to control and reapportion pronoiai depended on his military and financial strength and the political situation. Thus, when the aristocratic party prevailed, the emperor tended to grant Plethon's proposal was written after Manuel II had subdued the Moreote landlords and reclaimed royal rights over the Peloponnese. As a bureaucrat, jurist, and philosophical royalist, Plethon was hostile to the landed aristocracy and suggested confiscation of their estates. Because the land therein lay fallow while many peasants remained unemployed, he maintained, labor alone should give title to land, and the largely idle landlords should be forced to "accede to the common good." 34 It is likely that through these means Plethon intended to fuse the highly diverse peoples of the Peloponnese into a unified fighting peasantry on the basis of population mixing, homesteading, and the development of a correspondence between the private interest in land and the common interest in survival of Empire. To this end he proposed the "introduction of the opinion" that the land is equal and common to all dwelling on it according to nature.35 It appears then that Plethon's pro- In another controversial passage, Plethon attacked the power of the monasteries, one of the major obstacles to his program of redistribution and resettlement. He argued that the monks ("Philosophers") perform no public services in return for the public money which supports their "dronelike leisure." Thus their public support should be cut and their property taxed so that they must, through cultivation of their own considerable resources, become self-sufficient. "Much is needed for state affairs and even the whole of the treasury scarcely suffices for the common security. Then why in the world do we place this swarm of drones before the common good-those who do 'spiritual observances' and lie about-why should they profit so greatly rather than those doing many services for the public?" 3i Despite the harsh language Plethon's proposal was surprisingly moderate, probably in view of the great residual political and economic influence of the Byzantine monasteries. Lavishly supported by state and personal bequests, the monasteries promoted a broad range of welfare services. However, the monks also led politico-religious factions and did not hesitate to utilize sedition and riot to gain their ends.37 The monasteries, already owning one-third to one-half of the total arable land of the Empire and at least one-fourth of the Peloponnese, continued to confiscate peasant freehold through fraudulent litigation, corruption of officials, and economic pressure, but most usually left the land uncultivated or tilled it in a most desultory fashion. While many emperors fought monastic oppression of the free peasantry, generating a series of Novels beginning in 935, the power-weak Palaeologans had little choice but to allow their encroachments.38 Plethon argued for a civil religion in his address to Theodore, sounding a theme which would prove central to his later Laws. He argued that public and private accord on at least three religious tenets is necessary for public morality and, it would seem, national unity. The first tenet is that God exists, the second that he is concerned with human affairs and governs even minor conduct, and the third that his governance is absolutely just and unaffected by rites or sacrifices. Lampros, PP, pp. 125.3-126.7. In the Laws Plethon drops his Christian mask and reveals himself to be a pagan determinist. The Laws is a draft of a theocratic state based on mixed Platonic-Stoic institutions, a detailed code of moral regulations, and a complex and richly developed state cult geared to a luni-solar calendar. His Neoplatonic "Hellenic" theology is designed to provide the religious unity needed for national regeneration, and is composed of a hierarchy of four decads of gods and titans (including "demons") which serve as anthropomorphic representations of the Forms which govern the cosmos. See remains of the text in Alexandre, Lois. Plethon's political use of religion antedates More, Campanella, and Machiavelli (Discourses, i:chap. 11-15) and makes the loss of the political portions of his ms. all the more lamentable. into debt and depriving the state of taxable productivity. Because their fighting is defensive, they cannot be compensated properly with booty.
Plethon also opposed mercenary levies supported by a hearth tax because he considered the tax ruinous and foreign troops corrosive of "Hellenic" mores. It was also vain to suppose that mercenaries would sacrifice themselves for Hellenes. Inevitably they would crumble under attack and thus no savings would be realized because native reserves would still be needed as reinforcements.40
Plethon's insight into the conditions of national survival may have been partly attributable to his residence among the Turks. For he saw, as did few of his contemporaries, that the Turkish armies were unified and animated by a national and religious idea, and that the Empire's strategy of defending itself with "barbarian" mercenaries was no longer viable. His criticism was sadly prophetic. The Turks breached the Hexamilion and raided the Peloponnese in 1423, 1446, and for the last time in 1460. The ineffective resistance of the mercenaries and irregular peasant contingents quickly crumbled in the face of the Turk's discipline and artillery.41 In effect, then, Plethon's remedy was a return to the thematic system rationalized to ensure peasant autonomy from oppressive exaction and to preserve continuous agriculture even during periods of warfare. However, the creation of a "thematic" free peasant army animated by a national idea required complete restructuring of the class system according to Platonic ideas of functional specificity. Arguing, with Plato, that the division between classes exists in nature, Plethon ridiculed the confusion of functions by comparing the qualities of the warhorse with those of the donkey, stressing thereby the unsuitability of each for the other's task.42 The best laws assign "to each part of the city and of the people" their proper function and strictly punish nonfeasance.
The first and most necessary part (anankaiotaton meros) of the state is the productive class, which he designates Helots. This class is composed of primary producers: farm laborers (autourgikon), farmers (georgon), and shepherds (nome6n). The second class is composed of craftsmen (dcmiourgikon), merchants (emporikon), and tradesmen (kapelikon) who create, transport, and sell the goods necessary to life. The third or ruling class (to archikon phylon) is composed of the emperor or Basileus, I would say that these Helots should be assigned to the soldiers, to each footman one, to knights two, so that each soldier will not be hindered by labor from fighting, being provisioned by the Helots either by means of private or common property or however they may agree to complete the labor to acquire weapons with which to fight and the means to remain wherever they may be ordered.44 In the second case, where most of the population is capable of bearing arms, the duties of fighting and farming a common allotment should be rotated between two men. "In some places soldiers and Helots will be differentiated because not everyone is useful as a soldier; but where the greatest number seem fit for soldiering I would order these into pairs because this common yoking together is necessary so that in turn one can work the common stock of both while the other fights." 45 Because its interests in rulership. The ruling class, including the army, should engage itself neither in commercial enterprise nor production and is to be paid in provender (sitesis), wages (misthos tis), and honors (geras).4 Second, Plethon distinguished three modes of taxation which could be applied to the Helot class. The first type, corvee labor (angareia), he rejected as shameful, slavelike, and excessive. The second, a fixed monetary contribution (taktos chrematon horos), was unfair because it was not based on ability to pay, because it was difficult to apportion fairly, and because payment was difficult in view of the seasonal nature of agriculture. The third type of taxation, fixed portion of produce (he ... rhete ton gignomenon moira), Plethon's opinion, smacked the least of slavery and was the fairest and easiest to bear being automatically apportioned to the size of each year's harvest and thus the peasant's ability to pay. Of the taxes in kind collected from the Helots, one-third should be returned to the Helots for recapitalization and profit, one-third alloted to the capitalist class, and one-third to the support of the rulers.48 A small number of Helots may be assigned as servants or pages to high ecclesiastical and military officials, but Plethon contended that such luxury expenditure must be kept to a minimum, so that the state's concerted effort can be focused on national self-defense.49 Plethon's enlightened critique of Byzantine penology, which punished many minor crimes with mutilation or death, was predicated partially on the notion that prisoners should be mobilized to perform the necessary corvee labor for the national good.
It seems to me a better penalty, both in the interests of the constitution and most profitable to the community, to use these [criminals] to labor at rebuilding whatever is necessary; laboring to fortify the Isthmus and other places, so that neither will it be thought necessary for soldiers to persist in these labors, unless in emergencies, nor again that the above mentioned taxpayers supporting this [construction] through their contribution (which equals the whole debt they owe to the community), be troubled by this additional corvee.'" In summary, Plethon advocated adoption of functionally specific Platonic classes within the setting of a reformed thematic system. Resettlement of peasantry on confiscated estates was intended to create a solidary 47 
III. Plethon's Protectionist Economic Reforms
Plethon's economic recommendations were based on the presupposition that the Peloponnese, a rich producer of raw materials, could be rendered economically self-sufficient. If sumptuary laws restrained the court's penchant for foreign luxury goods, only iron and weapons would logically need be imported.51
In order to eliminate debased foreign coinage as the domestic exchange medium, Plethon advocated a quasi-barter economy, utilizing payments in kind in lieu of coin-taxes, restraining the use of coinage in domestic trade, and limiting imports to those exchangeable for cotton.
Likewise, one should not omit the unnatural condition of the coinage as something to be reformed. It is certainly foolish to utilize these bad foreign bronze coins, which bring profit to others and much mockery to ourselves.... If the taxpayers would contribute goods and not coins, and those taking from the treasury would take payment in kind, this would contribute much it would seem to our efforts. Less coinage would then be necessary and for exchange among ourselves any currently circulating coinage should suffice.... Certainly this land does not seem to need so many imports from abroad, necessitating so much coinage, except iron and weapons. It is easy to exchange cotton for these so that it would not be harmful to refuse to honor this base foreign coinage. This protectionist policy demonstrated insight, unusual for its time, into the economic preconditions of national autarky. As Plethon noted, the Peloponnese, properly cultivated, was potentially a rich economic base for defensive mobilization. In his time it exported cereals, fruits, vegetables, fine Malmsey wine, fibers, and extract products such as gum, oil, honey, and wax. Unexploited iron veins existed in the Eurotas Valley. The Despotate since 1348 had been a financially autonomous principality supporting itself through taxes on land, capital, imports, inheritance, and income, as well as special levies and corvees.54 Plethon's single tax, yoking, barter, and trade control may well have led to economic development of the region. However, European imperialism, a phenomenon beyond the limited medieval understanding of economics, intervened to ruin Plethon's calculations. For Venice controlled the major ports and thus the trade of the peninsula (Coron, Modon, Corinth, Argos, Patros, Nauplia) and also engaged in smuggling, counterfeiting, piracy, and confiscation of tariffs and duties. Thus, the growth of a native commercial middle class with developmental capital was effectively checked by Italian profiteering. The Byzantine state was further weakened economically by incessant civil war, tributes to the Turks, feudal oppression of the peasantry, and monastic encroachment on the land. 55 Plethon's advocacy of a barter economy was also designed to halt circulation of debased and counterfeit Ducats, Florins, and Tournois. Venice and the other European powers had introduced these debased media of exchange by prohibiting import of the raw precious metals which would have allowed the Greeks to coin Hyperpyra. This base foreign coinage bled the area of domestic treasure reserves.56 In return for native labor, raw material, and gold outflow, the Italians "dumped" their surplus and luxury production in the Peloponnese, effectively undercutting native industries. Further, through balance of power politics, the Italians rendered control of the unruly feudal lords virtually impossible and wreaked havoc with Greco-Turkish diplomatic relations. Thus, Plethon's proposals for the generation of economic autarky, though highly prescient given the state of medieval economic knowledge, were beyond the de facto powers of either the emperor or the despot."7
IV. Conclusion
Gemistos Plethon deserves a place in the history of political theory as one of the earliest proponents of the myth of nationalism and as a visionary reformer capable of articulating a program of reforms sufficient to give the myth objective socioeconomic and political form.
His nationalism, although quite modern in its denomination of the Hellenes as a genos united by language, ancestral culture, and common territory, is clearly a political myth designed to unify the court elites with the military, commercial, and producing classes and to neutralize both Christian ideology, at once quietistic and divisive, and the "feudalism" of the unruly landlords.
His policy of distributing land to the producers and his attack on monastic prerogatives were probably intended to revive the yeomanwarrior class of the older Thematic system. On this productive and unitary basis Plethon intended to erect a functionally specific tripartite class system comprised of primary producers, tradesmen and merchants, and a military ruling class under the command of the emperor. By consolidating the superabundance of taxes and duties into a single tax, onethird of the annual produce in kind, and by "yoking" the soldiers and farmers in a relation of interdependence, Plethon sought both to support a professional national army and to provide for continuous agriculture. Further, to ensure popular support, he proposed to reform the taxfarming bureaucracy and the harsh penal system. Through sumptuary laws, control of imports and exports, and domestic barter, he hoped to eliminate European control of the Peloponnesian economy and to create the conditions for the accumulation of native capital and autarchic economic development.
Although foreign pressure and internal collapse prevented the imple- Indeed, the entire field of Byzantine political thought, although copiously documented with a rich body of political chronicle, administrativelegal works, books of advice to and by kings, commentaries, literary works, and theoretical treatises proper, remains lamentably unexplored. Classically trained political theorists will find ample rewards in the study of a culture in continuous possession of the Hellenic-Christian tradition, a culture which in its thousand year history transmitted the fruits of this tradition to the Arabic, Slavic, and Western worlds and which was capable of inaugurating a renaissance at the moment of its extinction.
